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1-

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Appellee Sunshine Precious Metals, Inc. filed its voluntary

petition in bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Idaho on March 9, 1992, Case No. 92-00749, and is
currently the subject of a proceeding under Chapter 11 of the

United States Bankruptcy Code.

Therefore,

this court cannot

exercise jurisdiction over Sunshine Precious Metals, Inc.

The

Statement of Jurisdiction contained in the Brief of Appellant is
otherwise correct.

11•

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether the district court correctly granted partial summary
judgment in favor of Appellees Sunshine Mining, Inc., Sunshine

Precious Metals, Inc. and HMC Mining, Inc.
1.

Specifically:

Whether the district court correctly concluded that the

Burgin Lease does not require the lessee to do more work than the

"Minimum Annual Work" provision of the lease expressly requires;
and

2.

Whether the district court correctly concluded that the

Unit Lease does not require the lessee to do more work than the

"Minimum Work Requirements"

provision of the lease expressly

requires.

In reviewing the granting of a motion for summary judgment,

this court utilizes the same standard applied by the trial courts,
prescribed by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), which provides
that:

The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of

Utah R. Civ.

law.

P. 56(c).

Summary judgment is proper when the defendant is entitled to

judgment as a matter of law on the material, undisputed facts.
Payne v. Myers,

Blackham,

743 P.2d 186,

188

See

{Utah 1987); see also Norton v.

669 P.2d 857, 859 (Utah 1983).

The mere allegations of

a pleading cannot serve to create issues of fact for the purpose of
opposing

a motion

for

Saurini,

775 P.2d 420,

summary

judgment.

421 (Utah 1989)

See

D

& L Supply v.

(original complaint and

answer insufficient to defeat motion for summary judgment); see

also Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224, 226 (Utah 1983) (allegations
in non-movant's answer did not put facts in issue); Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett,

477 U.S.

317,

III.
A.

324

(1986).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

of

the Case.

This is an appeal from the granting of a partial summary
judgment in a case arising out of alleged breaches of mining
leases.

B.

Course of Proceedings

Appellee Sunshine Precious Metals, Inc. filed its voluntary

petition in bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for
the District of Idaho on March 9, 1992, Case No. 92-00749, and is

-

2

-

i

i

i

currently the

United

subject of a proceeding under

States Bankruptcy Code.

chapter

11 of the

Therefore, proceedings in this

court as to Appellee Sunshine Precious Metals,

Inc.

are stayed

pursuant to section 362 of the United States Bankruptcy Code (11
U.S.C. § 362).

Otherwise, Sunshine Mining Company ("Sunshine") and

HMC Mining, Inc. ("HMC") have no objection to the statement of the
course of proceedings in the Brief of Appellants.

Sunshine and HMC

have used the same shortened titles for documents used by Chief and
South Standard in the Brief of Appellants.
C.

Disposition

in District Court.

Sunshine and HMC have no objection to Chief's and South
Standard's statement of the disposition in the district court.

IV.

A.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS.

Overview of Undisputed Facts

The East Tintic Mining District ("the District") is located
in Utah and Juab Counties,

near the town of Eureka.

The District

contains several significant underground ore bodies bearing silver,
lead,

zinc,

Answer,

^8

gold,

and other metals.

(Complaint,

«[ 8 (R. 34);

(R.76).)

In 19 56,

Chief,

South Standard,

and their predecessors in

interest owned most of the land in the East Tintic Mining District.
These

companies

collectively

leased

their

lands

to

Bear

Creek

Mining Company, a subsidiary of Kennecott Copper Corporation, under
a Leases and Unit Agreement

("the Unit Lease").

-

3

-

Under the Unit

Lease,

Bear

Creek

acquired

a

10,0 00 acre "Unit Tract."
royalty

interest

property.

in

the

(Complaint,

fifty-year

mining

Additionally,
ores

mined

from

every

Mine

Unit

under

silver.

the

(R.75).)

the

other

lessor's

^9 (R.76 ).)

«[9 (R. 34); Answer,

lead and zinc,

mined by Kennecott pursuant to the Unit Lease.
flll

on

each lessor acquired a

The Burgin Ore Body containing silver,

(R.33); Answer,

tenancy

(Complaint,

was

flll

Kennecott also operated the Trixie

Lease.

The

Trixie

(Complaint, ^[13 (R. 33); Answer,

ores

contain gold

and

fll3 (R. 75-74).)

Kennecott ceased operations at the Burgin Mine in 1978.

On

October 15, 1980, Chief leased the Burgin Tract (after the Burgin
Tract had been severed from the remainder of the Unit Tract)

to

Sunshine Mining Company under a Mining Lease and Agreement ("the
Burgin Lease") .

(Complaint,

f^[16,

17 (R.32) ; Answer,

f516,

17

(R.74-73).)

In April of 1983, Kennecott conveyed all of its interest in

the Unit

Lease

acquired all

to HMC.

of the

stock

Sunshine

Mining

of HMC.

Company

Since that

subsequently

time,

Sunshine

Precious Metals, Inc. has conducted operations on the Unit Tract.
(Complaint, ^19 (R.32); Answer, ^[19 (R.73) .)
Sunshine Mining Company became the lessee of the Burgin Tract
in 1980; HMC became the lessee of the Unit Tract in 1983; by June

of 198 3, Chief was the sole lessor of

the Burgin Tract; and by

June of 1983, Chief and South Standard were the sole lessors of the

Unit Tract.

(Complaint, T[fl9, 20 (R.32); Answer, 5519, 20 (R.73);

_

4

-

i

Exhibit "A" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 1 (R.855).)
The Burgin Lease

The Burgin Lease contains the following provisions:
2.3

Chief acknowledges that during the term of

this Lease all decisions with respect to the character
of the work performed thereon by Sunshine under the

terms of this Lease shall be solely those of Sunshine,
whose only obligation to Chief in this regard is that
such work will be performed in a sound miner-like
manner.

(Exhibit

"A"

to

Sunshine's

Memorandum

in

Support

at

3

(R.853)(emphasis added).)

Section 5.

Manner of Work: Minimum Annual Work.

5.1 All exploration and development work and all
mining on the property shall be performed by Sunshine
m a sound miner-like manner, and except as to the
amount of minimum annual work required by Section 5.2.
the amount and character of all work shall be in the
sole and absolute discretion of Sunshine.

5.2
sums

m

Sunshine shall expend at least the following
exploration and development

on or for

the

benefit of the property during the periods indicated:
January

l,

1981

through December 31,

1981, $100,000 and a like sum for each year
thereafter until net smelter return royalties
are payable to Chief.

(Exhibit

"A"

to

Sunshine's

(R.851))(emphasis added).)

Memorandum

in

Support

Sunshine has complied

Section 5.2 of the Burgin Lease.

at

fully with

(Chief's Brief in Opposition at

7 (R.1066); Brief of Appellants at 20-21.)

The Burgin Lease also contains the following provision:
Sunshine shall provide all funds as it in its sole
m

ining judgment deems necessary for the exploration,
-

5

5

-

development and mining of the property.
(Exhibit

"A"

to

Sunshine *s

Memorandum

in

Support

at.

6

(R.850)(emphasis added).)

Additionally,

the

Burgin

Sunshine

shall

Lease

contains

the

following

provisions:

7.1

pay

the

following

royalties to Chief:

7.1.2

Commencing on January

1,

1982

and on

January 1 of each year thereafter, an advance
royalty of $100,000.

(Exhibit "A" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 6 (R.850).)
Sunshine Precious Metals,

Inc.

7.1.2 of the Burgin Lease.

has complied

fully with Section

(Chief's Brief in Opposition at 7

(R.1066); Brief of Appellants at 12.)

The Burgin Lease also contains the following provision:
15.3

In the event Sunshine fails to perform the

minimum work required by Section 5, the sole remedy of
Chief shall be termination of this Lease, and Chief
expressly waives any claim for damages it may have
against Sunshine for Sunshine's failure to perform such
work.

(Exhibit

"A"

to

Sunshine's

Memorandum

in

Support

at

11

(R.845)(emphasis added).)

The Burgin Lease provides at Section 19.2 that it "shall be
governed and interpreted in accordance with the laws of the State

of Idaho."

(Exhibit "A" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 12

(R.844).)
The

Unit

Lease

Article V of the Unit Lease contains the following provision:

-

6

-

i

In consideration of the foregoing leases, [Lessee]
does

hereby

covenant

and

agree

with

the

Lessors

as

follows:

1-

Minimum Work Requirements.

(a)

During each

of the first five years from the date hereof to expend
on exploration, development and mining operations the

sum of $100,000 a year on such portions of the land in
the Unit Tract as it shall deem advisable in order to

determine
the
probability
of
the
presence
of
merchantable ores therein and to develop and mine the
same. . . .
Beginning
in the seventh year and

continuing through the life of this lease and any
extension thereof, unless waived by the application of
the waiver clause in subparagraph 1(d) of this Article
V, [Lessee]*s minimum annual obligation to expend shall
likewise be $100,000 ....

(Exhibit "B" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 8-9 (R.825-

824)(emphasis added).)

Sunshine Precious Metals, Inc. has complied

with the minimum expenditure requirement of Article V, Section 1 of
the Unit Lease.

(Brief of Appellants at 39.)

Article VI, Section 9 of the Unit Lease reads as follows:
Integration

of

Agreement

-

Amendments.

This

Agreement constitutes the whole agreement between the
parties. There are no terms, obligations, covenants or
conditions other than contained herein.

No variation

thereof shall be deemed valid unless signed by the
parties representing 75% or more of the total acreage
of

the

Unit

Tract

with

the

same

formality

as

this

Agreement.

(Exhibit

"B"

to

Sunshine's

Memorandum

in

Support

at

24

(R.809)(emphasis added).)
B.

Contested Fact Issues Improperly Cited By Appellants

In Appellants'

Brief,

Chief and South Standard have asserted

as fact numerous allegations that are not supported by depositions,
answers to

interrogatories,

required by Rule 56(c).

admissions on

affidavits as

The allegations of fact which Sunshine and

-

t

file or

1

-

HMC contest

are set

forth

in

Exhibit

"A"

attached hereto.

Those

assertions were not before the district court in its consideration

of the motion for partial summary judgment and cannot be considered

by this court because they are outside the scope of Rule 56(c).
Those assertions are prejudicial, and should be stricken from the

Brief of Appellants and disregarded by this court.
Utah

Rule

of

Civil

Procedure

56(c)

allows

the

courts

to

consider only depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions
on

file,

affidavits

and

uncontroverted

allegations

of

the

pleadings.

Controverted allegations of the pleadings cannot be

considered.

See Guardian State Bank v. Humpherys, 762 P.2d 1084,

1086

(Utah

1988)(party

opposing summary judgment must provide

specific facts, and allegations from a pleading are insufficient);
see also Hall

v.

Fitzgerald.

671 P.2d

224,

226

(Utah

1983)

(allegations in non-movant's answer did not put facts in issue).
The United States Supreme Court similarly has held that a summary
judgment may

be opposed by any of the kinds of evidentiary materials

listed in [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure]
except the mere pleadings themselves,

56(c),

and it is from

this list that one would normally expect the nonmoving
party to make the showing to which we have referred.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317,

South

Standard•s

evidence,

assertions

are

not

324 (1986).

proper

are inflammatory and prejudicial,

Chief's and

summary

judgment

in many cases are

untrue, and should be stricken from the Brief of Appellants and
disregarded by this court.

V.

SUMMARY

OF ARGUMENT

The district court correctly concluded that the Burgin and
Unit leases do not require the lessees to do more work than is

expressly required by leases' minimum work provisions.

Imposing

additional obligations would be contrary to the express covenants
of the leases and would frustrate the intent of the parties.

Chief

and

South

Standard

claim that

every mining

lease

imposes on the lessee a duty to engage in a "reasonable" level of

exploration, development and mining activity, regardless of any
provisions expressly establishing the required levels or amount of
such activities.

Chief and South Standard also contend that the

lessees must perform a "reasonable" amount of work since the Burgin

and Unit leases expressly require the conduct of raining activity in
a "minerlike" or "miner-like" manner and require that the lessee

"remove,

insofar as practicable and consistent with good mining

practice,

all

commercial

ore

encountered,"

even

though

the

imposition of such unquantifiable work requirements would nullify
the express terms of each lease.

Contrary

Standard,

to

the

arguments

advanced

by

Chief

and

South

no court has ever

implied obligations contrary to a

contract's express covenants.

Significantly, every case cited by

Chief and South Standard holds that contractual obligations will be
implied only in the absence of express covenants to the contrary.
The

courts

must

not

imply

covenants

hostile

to

the

express

provisions of written contracts because to do so would undermine

-

9

-

the

law

of

contracts

and

leave

contracting

parties

devoid

of

certainty in performing their contractual obligations.

The parties to these leases have reduced their agreements to

writing and have specified in those written agreements the rights
and duties of each party.

This court should now enforce the intent

of the parties as expressed in the plain language of the leases.

VI.

A.

ARGUMENT

The district court correctly concluded that no implied

covenant requires the lessees to do more exploration, development

or mining work than is specifically required by the express minimum
work provisions of the Burgin and Unit leases.

No implied covenant requires the lessees to perform more work
than is specifically required by the express, written minimum work

provision of each lease, because the courts do not judicially imply
obligations that are contrary to the express agreements of the
parties.

The courts consistently and without exception have held that

express contractual agreements preclude the judicial implication of
covenants that are contrary to the parties'

See

Rip

Algom

Corp.

v.

Jimco

1980) (the contracting parties'

Ltd. , 618

express agreements.

P. 2d 497,

505

(Utah

express agreement "excludes the

possibility of an implied covenant of a different or contradictory
nature");

Meagher v.

Uintah Gas.

Co. f 185 P.2d 747,

752 (Utah

1947)(when specific exploration provisions were set forth in lease,

court

would

find

no other

such

provisions

because

parties'

intentions were found in "the provisions they [had] included in

-

10

-

their contract");

Ted R.

Brown and Associates,

Inc. v.

Carnes

CorP- > 753 p-2d 964, 970 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) ("a court may not

enforce asserted rights not supported by the contract itself");
Archer v.—Mountain Fuel Supply Co. . 642 P. 2d 94 3,
1982)(express
agreements

contractual

between

provision

parties

except

94 5 (Idaho

that there were
for

precluded implication of a separate,

two

written

no other
contracts

implied covenant) ; J^ R^

Simplot Co.—v, Chambers, 350 P.2d 211, 214 (Idaho 1960) (court
refused to limit contracting party's discretion to assign its
contract rights

by

implying a requirement that

its choice of

assignee be "reasonable"); Triangle Mining Co. v. Stauffer Chemical

Co^, 753 F.2d 734, 739-40 (9th Cir. 1985)(implied covenant of good
faith in mining lease may not impose
express provisions);

duties which conflict with

Brimmer v. Union Oil Co. of California. 81

F.2d 437, 440 (10th Cir.

193 6)("express covenant upon a given

subject excludes the possibility of an implied covenant of a
different or contradictory nature").
Perhaps

the

clearest

articulation

of

this

rule

is that

expressed by this court in Rio Algom Corp.. where the court said:

It is fundamental that, whether expressed or not,
every contract includes a covenant of good faith with
respect to dealings between the parties. The parties
to a contract must deal fairly and honestly with each
other,

h

contract

for

themselves.

court
the

will

not,

parties

however

than

they

make

a

have

made

better
for

. . . An express agreement or covenant

relating to a specific contract right excludes the
possibility of an implied covenant of a different or
contradictory nature.

618 P.2d at 505 (emphasis added).

-
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-

The Idaho Supreme Court in J. R.

Simplot Co., cited by this

court in Rio Algom Corp., similarly said:

To

right

construe

[the

contract]

as

to assign to a corporation

appellants

considered

"reasonable"

restricting

which

may

would

the

be by

necessitate

the insertion of words and the making by the Court of
a new contract.

This we cannot do.

Courts cannot make

for the parties better agreements than they themselves

have

been

satisfied

interpretation

to

relieve

make,
one

of

and

by

the

parties

a

terms which he voluntarily consented to

process
from

of
the

. . . ."

Rio Algom Corp., 618 P.2d at 505 (quoting J. R. Simplot Co., 350
P.2d at 214)(emphasis added).

No case cited

by Chief

and South Standard supports their

argument that an express contractual agreement can be nullified by
an

implied

covenant.

Although

Chief

cites

cases

and

other

authorities for the proposition that mining leases contain implied
covenants requiring reasonable diligence by the lessee, not one of

those cases involved a lease containing an express covenant dealing

with the amount of work required of the lessee or imposing any time
constraints on the lessee's performance.

Instead, each case cited

by

that

Chief

involves

a

lease

or

contract

was

silent

on

the

lessee's duty to mine.

Archer v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co.. 642 P.2d 943 (Idaho 1982)
and the Alumet Trilogy (Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co.,
679
Co.,

(Idaho App.

1986)

812 P.2d 286

Lake Grazing Co.,

("Alumet I'M : Alumet v.

(Idaho App.

they

Bear Lake Grazing

1989)("Alumet II'M : Alumet v. Bear

812 P.2d 253

inapplicable because

732 P.2d

(Idaho 1991)("Alumet III"))

involve

-
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leases which

-

did

not

are

contain

express covenants requiring the lessees to explore,

develop or

mine.

no

See

Archer,

642

P.2d

at

945

("We

find

express

covenant ... to mine and develop the property covered by the two
leases which the Archers now seek to rescind"); Aluraet I, 732 P.2d

at 683

("Our review of the lease discloses no expressly stated

covenant to develop") .

Similarly, none of the other mining lease

cases cited by Chief implies a covenant to mine or develop in the
face of an express covenant addressing the duty to mine.

See Ionno

v. Glen-Gery Corp., 443 N.E.2d 504 (Ohio 1983); Dulin v. West, 528
P.2d 411 (Colo. App. 1974); Shoni Uranium Corp. v. Federal-Radorock

Gas Hills Partners.

407 P.2d 710 (Wyo.

1965); Taylor v. Kingman

Feldspar Co., 18 P.2d 649 (Ariz. 1933).

It is clear from the Burgin Lease that the parties entered
into an express agreement relating to the amount of work required
of the lessee.

Section 5.2 of the Burgin Lease expressly provides

that until production is commenced and net smelter royalties are
payable

to Chief,

the lessee must spend at least $100,000 each

year for "exploration and development on or for the benefit of the

property" and that, except as to the amount of work required by
Section 5.2,

the amount and character of all work shall be in the

"sole and absolute discretion of

Sunshine."

("See Exhibit "A" to

Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 5 (R.851).)
provides

as

a

"Minimum Work

Requirement"

and a

The Unit Lease
"minimum annual

obligation to expend" that the lessee must spend $100,000 each year

for exploration, development and mining of the property.

-
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(Exhibit

"B" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 8-9 (R.82 5-24) .)

The

lease further provides that:
Integration

of

Agreement-Amendments.

This

Agreement constitutes the whole agreement between the

parties.

There are no terms, obligations, covenants or

conditions other than contained herein.

(Exhibit

"B"

to

Sunshine's

Memorandum

in

Support

at

24

(R.809)(emphasis added).)

Chief and South Standard agreed, in writing, to the "Minimum
Annual

Work"

and

"Minimum

Work

Requirements"

provisions

that

expressly limited the lessees' work obligations to an expenditure
of not more than $100,000 each year.

Additionally, in the case of

the Unit Lease, the parties expressly agreed in writing that the
lease

agreement

contained

no

terms,

obligations,

covenants

or

conditions other than those expressly stated in the written lease.
In spite of their express covenants, Chief and South Standard now

claim that the court should imply an obligation to spend whatever
is required

to

develop

and

mine

the

Burgin

Tract,

and

to

do

whatever is necessary to produce the maximum output of ore from the
Unit Tract.

This court and the

Idaho Supreme Court have refused

to imply covenants or agreements that would contradict and thereby
nullify an express agreement between the parties to a contract.

Those decisions are well grounded in law and public policy, and
this court should not imply a covenant in either the Burgin Lease
or the Unit Lease that would nullify the express minimum work
provisions and impose entirely new, different and unquantifiable
work obligations on the lessees.

-
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Chief

and

South

Standard

expressly

agreed

to

limit

the

lessees' obligations to explore, develop and mine the Burgin and
Unit Tracts, and the lessees are entitled to judgment as a matter
of

law that

explore,

they

have

not

breached

any

implied

obligation

to

develop or mine the properties.

B.

The district court correctly concluded that the Burgin

Lease "all funds" provision does not require the lessee to do more

exploration,

development

or mining

work

than is

specifically

required by the express minimum work provisions of the leases.

Section 6.1 of the Burgin Lease provides that:
Sunshine shall provide all funds as it in its sole

mining judgment deems necessary for the exploration,
development and mining of the property.

(Exhibit

"A"

to

Sunshine's

Memorandum

in

Support

at

6

(R.850)(emphasis added).)

Chief and South Standard contend that Section 6.1 requires
the lessee to spend whatever is reasonably necessary to explore,

develop and mine the property, in spite of the express language of
Section 5.1, captioned "Minimum Annual Work", which provides that:
.

.

.

except

as

to the

amount

of minimum

annual

work

required by Section 5.2 [$100,000 per year], the amount
. . . of all work shall
discretion of Sunshine.

be

in

the

sole

and

absolute

(Exhibit "A" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 5, 6 (R.85159) (emphasis added) .)

Section 6.1, the

"all funds" section,

does not create an

obligation to do more work than Section 5.1 specifically requires

because Section 5.1, the "Minimum Annual Work" section, expressly
quantifies and limits the amount of work required, and construing
-
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any other part of the lease to require more work would nullify the
express language of the "Minimum Annual Work" section.

Leases, like all contracts, must be construed as a whole,
giving effect to every express provision.

y^

Leventis,

773

P. 2d

341,

845

See, e.g. , G.G.A. . Inc.

(Utah Ct.

App.

1989)

(court

interpreted lease under general rules of contract construction) ;
Insurance Associates Corp. v. Hansen, 723 P.2d 190,192 (Idaho App.
1986)("a contract must be construed so as to give effect to every
part of it, if at all possible").
one provision

avoided;

Any construction that nullifies

as inconsistent with another should therefore be

instead,

a reasonable

interpretation

that

apparently conflicting provisions should be adopted.

reconciles
See G.G.A.,

Inc-/ 773 P-2d at 845; Insurance Associates Corp.. 723 P.2d at 192;
see also 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 309 (1963); Morris v. Kadrmas, 812

P.2d 549,
must

be

553 (Wyo. 1991)("provisions which apparently conflict
reconciled,

if

such

can

be

done

by

any

reasonable

interpretation, before a construction is adopted nullifying any
provision").

Sections 5.1 and 5.2 obligate the lessee to spend $100,000
each

year

and

expressly

provide

that

the

lessee

has

"absolute

discretion" to determine the "amount" of work, once it has spent
the required $100,000.

Any interpretation of the "all funds"

provision to impose an annual work obligation of more than $100,000
would take away from the lessee the "absolute discretion" granted
by Section 5.1 and nullify that express provision.

-
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Section 6.1 of the Burgin Lease, properly construed, does not
create

an

obligation

requirement.
as

a

to

exceed

the

express

minimum

work

Accordingly, the Defendants are entitled to judgment

matter

of

law

since

they

have

not

breached

any

such

obligation.

cThe district court correctly concluded that the use of
the term "miner-like" in the Burgin Lease does not require the
lessee to do more work than is specifically required by the express
"Minimum Annual Work" provision of the lease.

Section 2.3 of the Burgin Lease provides that:
Chief acknowledges that during the term of this
Lease all decisions with respect to the character of
the work performed thereon by Sunshine under the terms

of this Lease shall be solely those of Sunshine, whose
only obligation to Chief in this regard is that such
work will be performed in a sound miner-like manner.

(Exhibit

"A"

to

Sunshine's

Memorandum

in

Support

at

3

(R.853)(emphasis added).)

Additionally, Section 5.1 of the lease provides that:
Section 5.

5.1

Manner of Work; Minimum Annual Work.

All exploration and development work and all

mining on the property shall be performed by Sunshine in
a sound miner-like manner, and except as to the amount

of minimum annual work required by Section 5.2,
amount and character of

all work shall be

the

in the sole

and absolute discretion of Sunshine.

(Exhibit

"A"

to

Sunshine's

Memorandum

in

Support

at

5

(R.857)(emphasis added).}

Chief and South Standard argue that the use of the term
"miner-like" in Sections 2.3 and 5.1 requires the lessee to do a

"reasonable"

amount of exploration,

spite of the "Minimum Annual
-

Work"
17

-

development and mining,
provision,

in

which expressly

leaves the "amount" of work in the "sole and absolute discretion"
of

the

lessee.

The

use

of

the

term

"miner-like"

does

not

create

a

work

requirement because, as Chief and South Standard concede, no court

in any jurisdiction has held that the term "miner-like" implies a
requirement

to do any quantity

of work.

The creation

of an

open-ended and unquantifiable work obligation from the use of the

term "miner-like" would nullify the express "Minimum Annual Work"
provision of the lease.

Chief and South Standard also concede that no court has held

that the word "miner-like" implies an obligation to develop mining
property, to mine any amount of ore, or to develop mining property
within any time frame.

To the contrary, the courts have held that

"miner-like" speaks to the quality of the work done in a mining
project, and requires that work must be done "with due regard to
the safety, development and preservation of the leasehold." skaug

v. Gibbs, 235 P.2d 154, 157 (Wash. 1951).

In at least one case a

court has held that, even though the lessee had no obligation to

mine, all operations were to be conducted in a "good workmanlike
and miner-like manner." In re Gravhall Resources. Inc., 63 B.R.
382, 383 (Bankr. D. Colo.

Section

2.3,

1986).

unlike

Section

"amount" of work to be done,

but

5.1,

does

not

mention the

instead speaks only to the

"character" of the work, saying that the lessee's obligation with
respect to the

"character" of the work performed is that it "will

-
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be performed in a sound miner-like manner."

Section 5.1, says that "all exploration and development work
and all mining on the property shall be performed by the lessee in
a sound miner-like manner," and immediately thereafter and in the
same sentence,

it says that the "amount" of the work "shall be in

the sole and absolute discretion" of the lessee "except as to the

amount of minimum annual work required by Section 5.2."

Section

5.1 does not say that the lessee must do a "miner-like" amount of

work,

but instead expressly leaves the amount of work in the sole

and absolute discretion of the lessee.

Leases

and

all

contracts must

be construed so that

every

provision is given effect.

See e.g., G.G.A., Inc. v. Leventis, 773

P.2d

1989) ; Insurance

341,

845

(Utah

App.

Hansen, 723 P.2d 190, 192 (Idaho App.

Associates

1986).

Corp.

v.

As discussed in the

preceding section, Sections 5. 1 and 5.2 obligate the lessee to
spend $100,000 each year and expressly provide that the lessee has
"absolute discretion" to determine the "amount" of work, once it

has spent the required $100,000.

Any interpretation of the lease's

"miner-like" provisions to create an annual work obligation of more
than

$100,000

discretion"

would

granted

take

by

away

Section

from

the

lessee

5.1

and

nullify

the

"absolute

that

express

provision of the lease.
The use of the term "miner-like"

not

create

requirement,

an

obligation

and

this

to

court

exceed
should

-
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in Sections 2.3 and 5.1 does

the
affirm

express
the

minimum

judgment of

work
the

district

court.

D.
The district court correctly concluded that the use of
the term "minerlike'1 in the "Quality of Work" section of the Unit
Lease does not require the lessee to do more work than is
specifically required by the "Minimum Work Reguirements" section of
the

lease.

The

Unit

Lease

contains

sections

captioned

"Minimum Work

Requirements", "Quality of Work", and "Integration of Agreement."
Those sections provide that:

Minimum Work Requirements.
(a)
During each of
the first five years from the date hereof [the lessee
covenants] to expend on exploration, development and
mining operations the sum of $100,000 a year on such
portions of the land in the Unit Tract as it shall deem

advisable in order to determine the probability of the
presence of merchantable ores therein and to develop
and mine the same.
...
Beginning in the seventh
year and continuing through the life of this lease and
any extension thereof, unless waived by the application
of the waiver clause in subparagraph 1(d) of this
Article V, [Lessee]'s minimum annual obligation to
expend shall likewise be $100,000 ....

(Exhibit "B" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 8-9 (R.8 2524)(emphasis added).)

Quality of Work. [Lessee covenants to] perform all
exploration, development, and mining work in the
premises leased herein in a minerlike fashion.

All such

work shall at all times be under the sole control of,
and be done in accordance with,
the exercise of

discretion and judgment of [Lessee] as to time, place
and method of operation.

(Exhibit

"B"

to

Sunshine's

Memorandum

in

Support

at

(R.820)(emphasis added.)
Integration of
Agreement
- Amendments.
This
Agreement constitutes the whole agreement between the

parties.

There are no terms, obligations, covenants or

conditions other than contained herein.

No

variation

thereof shall be deemed valid unless signed by the
parties representing 75% or more of the total acreage of
-

20

-

13

the

Unit

Tract

with

the

same

formality

as

this

Agreement.

(Exhibit

"B"

to

Sunshine•s

Memorandum

in

Support

at

24

(R.809)(emphasis added).)

Chief and South Standard argue that the use of the term
"minerlike"

requires

in the

the

"Quality of Work"

lessee

to

spend

section of the unit

whatever

amount

lease

ultimately

is

necessary to develop and mine the property, despite the parties'

express understanding to limit the work required of the lessee and
despite their express understanding that the written instrument
contains their "whole agreement."

The use of the word "miner like"

in the "Quality of Work"

section of the lease does not create a work obligation because, as
discussed

in the preceding section,

"minerlike" has never been

construed to require a "reasonable" amount of mining activity, and
because such a construction would nullify the intent of the parties
as expressed in the "Minimum Work Requirements" section and in the
"Integration of Agreement" section.

The Unit Lease contains both a "Minimum Work Requirements"
section

and

Requirements"

a

"Quality

section

of

Work"

says

that

section.

the

lessee

The

"Minimum

will

Work

"expend

on

exploration, development and mining operations the sum of $100,000
a year" and that the lessee's "minimum annual obligation to expend
shall ... be $100,000."

The "Minimum Work Requirements" section

does not use the word "minerlike."

The term "minerlike" appears

only in the "Quality of Work" section of the lease.

-
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That section

says that the lessee covenants to work "in a minerlike fashion" but
does not refer to the amount of work to be done and does not say
that the

lessee must do a

The

captions

of

"minerlike"

the

"Quality

amount of work.

of

Work"

section

and

the

"Minimum Work Requirements" section, together with the parties' use
of "minerlike" in the "Quality of Work" section, and the omission
of

"minerlike"

manifest

an

from

the

intention

"Minimum

that

Work

"minerlike"

Requirements"
would

apply

section,

only

to

the

quality of the work done, and would not apply to the amount of work
to

be

done.

require

Moreover,

any

especially

quantity

in

a

"minerlike"

of

work

and

has

never

should

not

been

be

lease that expressly quantifies

construed

so

and

to

construed,

limits

the

lessee's work obligation.
The lease must be construed as a contract to give effect to
all of its terms.

752

P. 2d

892,

See,

895

e.g.,

(Utah

Buehner Block Co.

1988)

(contract

v.

UWC Associates,

interpretation

should

harmonize all provisions and give effect to all terms); G.G.A.

v.

Leventis, 773 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah Ct. App. 1989)(lease interpreted
under

rules

of

contract

construction

that

avoided

effect

"if

conflicting

construction).

nullifies
can

provisions

be
in

any

given
a

interpretation will control."
266 P.2d 494,

495-96

contract
to

both

reasonable
Hardinge Co.,

(Utah 1954).

-
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Under

Utah

provision
of

two

law,

should

be

apparently

reconciliation
Inc.

a

that

v. Eimco Corp.,

This court can reconcile and give effect to every part of the
lease by holding

that the "Minimum Work

Requirements"

section

establishes the lessee's minimum work obligation, that the "Quality
of Work" section governs only the quality of work,

and that the

"Integration of Agreement" section means what it says:

that the

written lease instrument is the "whole agreement" of the parties.
In contrast, the court cannot accept the construction advocated by
Chief and South Standard unless the court finds from the face of

the written lease that (a) the parties intended, but neglected to
say, that the lessee's obligation to spend $100,000 each year is
only part of the lessee's "Minimum Work Requirement" and "minimum

annual obligation";
insert

(b)

the parties

into the caption of Article V,

intended,

but failed,

to

Section 5 the words "and

quantity", so that the caption would read "Quality and Quantity of
Work";

(c)

the parties intended,

but neglected to say, that the

lessee must not only work in a "minerlike fashion" but must also do

a "minerlike" quantity of work; and (d) the parties did not intend
for the "Integration of Agreement" section to say that the written

lease "constitutes the whole agreement between the parties" but
instead intended the section to say that the written instrument

"constitutes most of the agreement between the parties."
The use of the term "minerlike" in Article V,

Section 5 of

the Unit Lease does not create an obligation to exceed the express

minimum work requirement, and this court should affirm the judgment
of

the

district

court.

-
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EThe district court correctly concluded that the Unit
Lease "all ore" provision does not require the lessee to do more

exploration,

development

or

mining

work

than

is

specifically

required by the minimum work provision of the lease.

The Unit Lease, under the caption "Shipment and Conservation

of Ores," provides at Article V, Section 7 that the lessee agrees
to

. . . remove, insofar as practicable and consistent with good
mining

practice,

all

commercial

ore

encountered

in

exploration, development and mining operations in the Unit
Tract, to the end that said ores shall be preserved or
removed and shall not be wasted or left in an inaccessible
condition.

(Exhibit "B" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 13 (R.820).
The provision does not, as Chief claims, create an obligation to
exceed the express minimum work requirement of the lease, because

the language of Article V, Section 7 does not expressly so state.

Such an obligation would nullify the express minimum work obliga
tion of Article V, Section 1 providing that the lessee's "minimum
annual obligation to expend shall ... be $100,000 . . . ."

(See

Exhibit "B" to Sunshine's Memorandum in Support at 8-9 (R.825-24).)
As discussed

in

construed as a whole,
express provision.

the preceding

leases

must

be

harmonizing and giving effect to every

See, e.g. , Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Associates,

752 P.2d 892, 895 (Utah 1988);
266 P.2d 494,

section,

495-96

Hardinge Co., Inc. v. Eimco Corp.,

(Utah 1954);

G.G.A..

Inc. v.

Leventis.

773

P.2d 841, 845 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

There is no express requirement in Article V, Section 7 that

the lessee produce the greatest possible amount of ore during any
-
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time period or,
lease.

for that matter,

during the entire term of the

There is no language in that section or anywhere else in

the lease that expressly purports to impose any manner of time
constraint or production quota on the lessee.
Article V,

Section 7 cannot be construed to

create a work

obligation in excess of the express minimum work obligation without

nullifying

Article

V,

Section

1.

Article V,

Section 7 can,

however, reasonably be construed to harmonize and give effect to
each express provision of the lease by interpreting Section 7 to
require that, as the tract is mined, at whatever pace the lessee
elects, "ores shall be preserved or removed and shall not be wasted
or left in an inaccessible condition."

Article V,

express

Section 7 of

or implied work

the Unit Lease does

obligation which

exceeds

not create an

the

express

minimum work requirement of Article V, Section 1 of the lease.

The

lessee is entitled to judgment as a matter of law since it has not

breached any such express or implied obligation.

VII.

CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF

The Burgin Lease and the Unit Lease clearly express the
intent of the parties to quantify and thereby limit the work
obligations of the lessees.

Those leases cannot be construed to

create additional work requirements without disregarding the intent
of the parties as expressed on the face of each lease.

Sunshine

Mining Company and HMC Mining, Inc. therefore pray that this court

-
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affirm the judgment of the district court.
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APPENDIX A

APPENDIX
C C11 'r"^T"n

The

following allegations

of

A

^ ^v C T S

facts

should be

stricken

from

Appellant's Brief:

Sunshine did not
scheduled.

Indeed,

implement
during

its

1985

1984

Mining Plan as

Sunshine

cut

back

on

expenditures and activities at the Burgin Mine.
Brief of Appellants at 9.

The Feasibility Study concluded that it is feasible to

develop and mine the Burgin Ore Body, and the study projected
that Sunshine would receive a 26% per annum return on its
investment in the Burgin Mine. Sunshine did not implement its
1988 Feasibility Study, however, or any other plan to reopen
the Burgin Mine.
Brief of

Appellants at 9-10.

The gross metallic value of the "proven and probable ore

reserves" in the Burgin Mine is approximately $400 million at
current metals prices.

Sunshine has continually delayed the

implementation of its purported plans to bring the Burgin Mine
back into production.

Sunshine in fact has no intention to

bring the Burgin Mine back into production without the use of
someone else's money, and then only if it can obtain a return

on its investment that is unreasonably high to demand.
Brief of Appellants at

10.

Under legal definitions promulgated by the United States

Securities and Exchange Commission, "proven and probable ore
reserves" are those mineral deposits which are established
with a high degree of assurance and which can be mined

economically (i.e. at a profit to the mining company) . See 46
Fed. Reg. 18949, Item 7A(a)(l), (2),

(3).

These definitions

apply_ to securities-related filings by registrants like
Sunshine who are engaged in significant mining operations.
Brief of Appellants at 10 (n. 8).
Furthermore,

Sunshine

has

repeatedly

misled

Chief

regarding Sunshine's true intentions for the Burgin Mine;
Sunshine has refused to negotiate in good faith with Chief
toward the formation of a joint venture to develop the Mine;
Sunshine has mortgaged the Mine for purposes unrelated to
mining, without informing Chief; and Sunshine has converted
numerous items of mining equipment leased by Chief to

Sunshine.

For example,

in 1935, when Sunshine was cutting

back on its expenditures for the Burgin Mine, Sunshine was
simultaneously making optimistic representations to Chief

regarding Sunshine's intention to reopen the Mine.
Brief of Appellants at
In 1988,

10-11.

Sunshine told Chief that Sunshine was committed

to commencing work on the Burgin Mine by the end of that
summer, but Sunshine did not begin the work as represented.
Brief of Appellants at

11.

Although Sunshine had indicated . . .its willingness

to confer with Chief on a partnership,

Sunshine never

responded to Chief's proposal and refused even to begin
good faith negotiations with Chief. On various occasions
over the years Sunshine has removed from the Burgin Mine

numerous items of mining equipment owned by Chief.
Sunshine used some of the equipment at its out-of-state
mining operations,

....

These actions constitute bad

faith and unfair dealing en Sunshine's part.
Brief of Appellants at

11.

Sunshine's acts of bad faith and its failure to bring the
Burgin Mine back into production have caused Chief injury in
the delay of royalty income that Chief would have received if

Sunshine had performed under the Lease as required.
Brief of Appellants at

11.

Shortly after Sunshine took over the Unit Lease in 1983,

the Sunshine staff completed a Three Year Operating Plan and
Budget

(the

"1983

Operating

Plan"),

which

recommended

a

variety of exploration, development, and mining activities on
several Unit Lease target areas.
the

198 3

Operating

Plan,

however.

Sunshine never acted upon
Between

1983

and

1988,

Sunshine's Unit Lease activities consisted of operating the
Trixie Mine on an

intermittent basis at one-third or less of

its
capacity,
and
conducting
sporadic,
inconclusive
exploration and development activities elsewhere within the
Unit

Tract.

Brief of Appellants at

14.

The 1988 Special Report described fourteen exploration
and development targets on the Unit Tract, and concluded that
if aggressive exploration was
started and maintained a

production rate of 500 to 1,000 tons per day of precious metal
bearing ore could be achieved.
The 1988 Resource Inventory
identified sixteen exploration and development targets on the
Unit Tract,
and described some of these targets as
"excellent."

Brief or Appellants at 14-15.

Despite the huge and excellent potential of the Unit
Tract as described in the 1983 Operating Report, the 1988
Special Report, and the 1983 Resource Inventory, Sunshine
has not undertaken any major exploration, development, or
mining activities on the Unit Tract. From 1983 through
the present, Sunshine's activities on the Unit Tract have

consistently fallen below the level of diligence that a
reasonable and faithful mining company would have
demonstrated.
Sunshine has failed to exploit the full
potential of the Trixie Mine, and Sunshine has done

virtually nothing to exploit or even explore the numerous
other Unit Lease targets described in the 1983 Operating
Report,

the 1988 Special Report,

and the 1988 Resource

Inventory.

Brief of Appellants at 15.
Furthermore,

Sunshine has concealed from Chief the true

Unit Lease rights and responsibilities of Sunshine and HMC .
. .and Sunshine has mortgaged the Unit Tract for non-mining
purposes without informing Plaintiffs. These acts constitute

bad faith and unfair dealing on Sunshine's part.
Brief of Appellants at 15.
Chief and South Standard leased their valuable lands to

Sunshine under two long term mining leases,

based upon the

justifiable expectation that Sunshine would endeavor to mine

the

leased

properties

and

thereby

royalties for Chief and South Standard.

generate

production

Sunshine has located

vast quantities of ore that hold the promise of millions of
dollars in royalties for Chief and South Standard, as well as
millions of dollars in profits for Sunshine.
But Sunshine
refuses

to

spend the

money

and perform the

labor that are

required to develop and mine these ores.
In addition,
Sunshine has at times acted deceitfully and unfairly toward
Chief and South Standard.

Sunshine's acts and omissions have

been contrary to the fundamental intent and purpose of each
Lease,
and contrary to Sunshine's express and implied
covenants

in each Lease.

Brief of Appellants at 16.

Sunshine has in fact determined that the funding required
for the development of the Burgin Mine is substantially
greater than that required to satisfy the minimum expenditure
clause.

Brief of Appellants at 17.

Under the circumstances of this case, a "miner-like"
level of development and mining work requires more than the
minimum level of expenditures.
Brief of Appellants at 17.

[T]he required level of performance demands more than can
be accomplished with the minimum expenditure of funds.
Brief of Appellants at 17.
Because

commercial

ores

exist

in

abundance

on the Unit

Tract, it is not possible to satisfy this requirement by the
mere expenditure of the minimum amount.

Brief of Appellants at 18.

Under the circumstances surrounding the Unit Lease, a
reasonable and skillful mining company would perform at a

level requiring more than the minimum expenditure.
Brief of Appellants at 18.

Sunshine cannot satisfy this implied-in-law obligation by
the expenditure of only the minimum amount.
Brief of Appellants at 18.
Sunshine's prevarications and mischief constitute breach

of the Unit Lease irrespective of Sunshine's compliance or
non-compliance with the minimum expenditure clause in the
Lease.

Brief of Appellants at 18.

"Commercial" means minable at a profit to the mining
company.

Brief of Appellants at 18.

[A]n ineffectual and unprincipled mining company is tying
up 10,000 acres of rich mining lands in Utah County.
Chief
and South Standard are deprived of millions of dollars per

year in royalties deferred indefinitely, with no hope of
obtaining a good and honest lessee until at least the year
2030.

Brief of Appellants at 19.

Sunshine management insists that it will not bring the
Burgin Mine back into production unless
development funds from a joint venturer.

it

can

obtain

Brief of Appellants at 21.

(1) It is Sunshine's mining judgment that a new mining
operation is feasible and profitable; (2) It is Sunshine's
mining judgment that $2.3 million is required for the next
phase of mine development; and (3) Sunshine proposes that a
partner should provide 63% of
50% working interest.

forward costs in return for a

Brief of Appellants at 21.

The parties expressly agreed that Sunshine does not have
discretion to make decisions that result in unminer-like
performance.

Brief of Appellants at 27.

Despite Sunshine's understanding and belief that mining
the Burgin Mine would be profitable, and despite the fact that
Sunshine has had ample funds for mine development, Sunshine
has

not

even

started

to

bring

the

Burgin

Mine

back

into

production.

Brief of Appellants at 28.

Sunshine

believes

that

a

new

mining

operation

is

feasible, but Sunshine proposes that it should spend only 37%
of the money necessary for the project.
Brief of Appellants at 23.

[W]hen Sunshine entered into the Burgin Lease it tacitly

promised to work vigorously on the fantastically promising
Burgin Mine project.

Brief of Appellants at 34 (n. 19).

Specifically, Sunshine has repeatedly misled Chief
regarding its intentions for the Burgin Mine.
Although
Sunshine insists upon a joint venture partner as a
precondition to developing the Mine, Sunshine has refused to
negotiate in good faith with Chief toward the formation of a
joint venture. Sunshine has converted various items of leased

mine equipment belonging to Chief.

Sunshine surreptitiously

mortgaged the Burgin Mine for purposes unrelated to raining the
Burgin Mine.
Brief of Appellants at 36.

Sunshine has not adequately explored, developed, or mined
the Trixie Mine or any of the numerous targets described in
the 1983 Operating Report, the 1988 Special Report, and the
19 8 8 Resource Inventory.

Brief of Appellants at 40.

Sunshine

has

failed

to

take

miner-like

steps

to

adequately explore, develop, and mine the Trixie Mine and the

numerous other targets described in the 1983 Operating Report,

the 1988 Special Report, and the 1988 Resources Inventory.
Brief of Appellants at 42.

In late 1982, Kennecott suspended its mining operations
at the Trixie Mine on the Unit Tract. Shortly thereafter, Mr.
Paul

Hunter,

a

former

Kennecott

employee,

contacted

Mr.

Leonard Weitz, Chief's President, regarding the possibility
that Mr. Hunter or a nominee company would acquire Kennecott*s
interest in the Unit Lease.

Brief of Appellants at 45.

During

the

course

of

their

discussions,

Mr.

Hunter

described for Mr. Weitz numerous specific plans and intentions
that Mr. Hunter had for the resumption of operations at the
Trixie Mine and the processing of Trixie ores.
Mr. Hunter
stated,

for example,

that he intended to have the Trixie Mine

fully operational on or about June 1,

1983.

He also stated

that (1) HMC would acquire the Unit Lease from Kennecott, (2)
HMC would be merged into Sunshine, and (3) Mr. Hunter would be
in charge of Unit Lease operations for Sunshine, such that he
would have the power to implement his stated plans and
intentions for the Trixie Mine.

Brief of Appellants at 46.

In fact,
Mr.
Hunter's true plans were totally
inconsistent
with
his
representations
to
Mr.
Weitz.
Mr. Hunter had actually reached an agreement with Sunshine

which entailed that immediately after HMC acquired Kennecott's
Unit

Lease

interest,

HMC

would

shut

down

the

Unit

Lease

property and maintain it in a standby condition for at least
six months.

The agreement between Mr. Hunter and Sunshine

also entailed that Sunshine would provide the funds necessary
to maintain the Unit Lease property in a shutdown and standby
condition, because Sunshine did not intend to operate the
property in the immediate future.
Brief of Appellants at 46.

Chief relied upon Mr. Hunter's false representations by
6

giving its consent to the proposed assignment of the Unit
Lease from Kennecott to HMC.
After the assignment from
Kennecott

to

HMC

was

consummated

in

April,

1983,

HMC

immediately shut down the Unit Lease property and maintained
it in a standby condition, at Sunshine's expense. In June,
1983, Sunshine . . . took over all activity on the Unit Tract.

Neither HMC, nor Sunshine, nor Mr. Hunter ever took the steps
that Mr. Hunter said he intended to take to mine and process
the Trixie Mine ores.

These circumstances constituted fraud

in the inducement of Chief's consent to the assignment of the
Unit

Lease.

Srief of Appellants at 46-47.

U824 29 doc jdiiendumA

